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The traditional approach to torts, both legal and economic, has always 
started from a simple premise, which assumes one tortfeasor, one victim, 
and a clear causal relationship between the tortious conduct of the tortfea-
sor and the damage suffered by the victim. However, in reality there can be 
many deviations from this classic case. One such deviation is where the 
causal relationship in the simple case of a single possible tortfeasor and 
victim is not clear. Other deviations may occur when there is a multitude of 
contributing tortfeasors and/or victims and the question arises whether a 
tortfeasor should be held liable for the entire injury to a particular victim 
when others also tortiously contributed and/or when there are multiple vic-
tims. The liability issue is especially complicated when there are multiple 
tortfeasors and/or victims and there is uncertainty concerning the contribu-
tion of each tortfeasor to each victim’s injury.
In some cases, the legislature allocates liability exclusively to one par-
ty through so-called channeling of liability. Legal channeling of liability 
(for example, in international conventions with respect to nuclear liability) 
exclusively allocates liability to one party (e.g. the licensee of a nuclear 
operator) and excludes liability suits against others. Vicarious liability is 
another instance where someone other than the tortfeasor may also, or in-
stead, be held liable. This occurs when a superior (like an employer) is held 
liable for acts of a subordinate (an employee).
The goal of this article is to discuss some of the aforementioned cases 
of attribution of liability that deviate from the classic case (i.e. one injurer 
causing damage to one victim). This article makes an inventory of those 
deviations and discusses to what extent the legal solutions make sense from 
an economic perspective. This article uses economic analysis of both acci-
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dent law and comparative law, and therefore is a contribution to compara-
tive law and economics.
After an introduction, Section II discusses the economic starting 
points for attribution of liability and, more generally, sketches the goals of 
accident law. The next two sections discuss cases of multiple tortfeasors. 
Section III analyzes how domestic tort law in various jurisdictions deals 
with accidents caused by multiple tortfeasors. In this section, specific atten-
tion is paid to the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) drafted by the 
European Group on Tort Law. Section IV analyzes accidents caused by 
multiple tortfeasors in a law and economics framework. This Section spe-
cifically examines the circumstances under which so-called “solidary liabil-
ity” (often referred to as joint and several liability) can be justified. This 
Section makes a distinction between a case involving full solvency of the 
various tortfeasors and a case with possibly insolvent tortfeasors. Section V 
then discusses the phenomenon of channeling of liability. This section pro-
vides a variety of examples of channeling from international conventions 
and provides an insurability perspective. It also studies some reasons and 
justifications for channeling of liability. Finally, Section VI—for the sake 
of completeness—briefly addresses the case of vicarious liability. This 
section explains the phenomenon and considers the precise economic ra-
tionale of vicarious liability.
This article, which focuses on attribution of liability while taking into 
account causal uncertainty, is written from both comparative legal and 
economic perspectives. It gives equal attention to the issue of how various 
solutions (such as channeling or joint and several liability) may affect the 
insurability of the risk.
II. ECONOMIC STARTING POINTS
There is a remarkable difference between the way in which traditional 
lawyers view the liability system and the way in which it is viewed from an 
economic efficiency perspective. Traditional tort lawyers view the tort 
liability system as being aimed at preventing or at least compensating un-
just injuries.1 From that perspective, victim protection and more particular-
ly ex post compensation of victims is the major goal of accident law.2 In 
that view, liability rules clearly aim to compensate victims and the bench-
1. See, e.g., LOUIS VISSCHER, DEBATED DAMAGES 14 (2015) (discussing the tort liability theory 
of the Dutch lawyer Bloembergen, who regards compensation as the “central goal” of the law of dam-
ages); Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 163–
70 (2002). 
2. VISSCHER, supra note 1.
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mark by which a liability system will be judged is whether it is able to pro-
vide this compensation.3
An economic analysis of accident law takes a different perspective. 
Economists stress that the exposure to liability of a potential injurer will 
provide incentives for accident prevention.4 The central idea is that actors 
(predominantly industrial operators, but also others) will react to a potential 
exposure to efficiently designed liability by taking optimal preventive 
measures.5 In this perspective, the goal of the liability system is not ex post
compensation, but rather ex ante prevention. “Prevention is better than 
cure” is the guiding principle for the economic analysis of law.6 This start-
ing point has two important consequences. First, the idea is that when oper-
ators are not exposed to the financial consequences of their actions via a 
liability rule, their incentives for prevention will fail, unless other legal 
rules (i.e. regulation) would provide an alternative.7 Second, an equal con-
sequence is that exposing an operator to efficiently designed liability ex
post (after the accident) will provide an ex ante incentive to take optimal 
care.8 Thus, from an economic perspective, a liability system has an im-
portant social function in remedying market failures.9
At the end of last century, there were fierce debates between econo-
mists and lawyers on the goals of tort law and some attempts were made to 
reconcile the traditional legal (corrective justice) approach with the eco-
nomic (efficient deterrence) approach.10 Now, especially in the environ-
mental arena, the legal community and policymakers have become more 
and more convinced of the importance of liability rules as an instrument of 
3. See Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, Social Security Versus Tort Law as Instruments to Com-
pensate Personal Injuries: A Dutch Law and Economics Perspective, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW 22–25 (Ulrich Magnus ed., 2003).
4. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 (1980); see 
also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5 (1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
5. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24–28 
(1970). 
6. See VISSCHER, supra note 1, at 16.
7. See WILLEM H. VAN BOOM, TORT LAW AND REGULATORY LAW (Meinhard Lukas & Christa 
Kissling eds., 2007) for a discussion on how regulation and tort law could mutually work together to 
provide incentives for care and contribution. 
8. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 5–7.
9. For a discussion of the economic analysis of environmental liability and the role of tort law in 
that respect see LUCAS BERGKAMP, LIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW 
ASPECTS OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 67–119 
(2001); KRISTEL DE SMEDT, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: A LAW AND 
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 28–64 (2007); MARK WILDE, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE US 138–48 (2d ed. 2013).
10. See Gary Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming both Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801–34 (1997).
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efficient and/or just prevention.11 One of the reasons for this change is due 
to the availability of increasing empirical evidence, demonstrating that 
industrial operators respond to financial incentives provided through the 
liability regime.12
III. MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS IN THE LAW
This Section addresses how the law generally deals with a situation 
involving multiple tortfeasors. It starts by providing two examples of quite 
different situations and then explains the basic approach to liability in each 
situation in many legal systems as well as the justifications for that ap-
proach. In Europe, multiple tortfeasors have been dealt with in the so-called 
Principles of European Tort Law proposed by the European Group on Tort 
Law (of which the author is a member), which also merits discussion. Fi-
nally, this section discusses the issue of contribution between multiple tort-
feasors held liable for the same injury.
A. Two Examples
Cases involving multiple tortfeasors often discuss the legal doctrine of 
“concurrent causes,” in which more than one tortfeasor contributed to the 
plaintiff’s injury. The literature examines several cases that illustrate the 
problems that multiple tortfeasors may cause. An interesting example of 
concurring causes involves two factories that discharge poisonous 
wastewater into a river and, as result, fish in the river die.13 The wastewater 
of each factory separately was sufficient to kill the fish.14 This is a typical 
situation that could arise in not only domestic but also transboundary pollu-
tion cases. Consider an instance where two upstream countries contribute 
11. The preventive effect of liability rules was explicitly stressed in the EU White Paper on 
Environmental Liability, which preceded the European Environmental Liability Directive. EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, WHITE PAPER ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 5 (2000). See also Deterrence, Insurability 
and Compensation in Environmental Liability. Future Developments in the European Union, in 5 TORT 
AND INSURANCE LAW (Michael Faure ed., 2003) for a commentary on the White Paper on Environmen-
tal Liability. 
12. For an overview of empirical evidence concerning the effects of liability rules see generally 
DON N. DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY
(1996); Benjamin Van Velthoven, Empirics of Tort, in 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 453, 453–98 
(Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009). For an overview of empirical evidence with respect to the deterrent 
effect of environmental liability rules, see Michael G. Faure, Designing Incentives Regulation for the 
Environment, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS. ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN 
BUILDING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 275–307 (2012).
13. Another example would be a case where two cars are racing down a street and one of them 
hits a pedestrian. This is a case where the defendants have, in fact, acted together to cause the victims 
harm. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 383 (5th ed. 2008).
14. The example comes from UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION 6 (Jaap Spier ed., 2000).
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by emitting polluting substances that cause harmful consequences in anoth-
er state downstream. Interestingly, in this particular case, all jurisdictions 
unanimously hold that the tortfeasors should be jointly and severally lia-
ble.15
A second classic example, in which there are multiple possible rather 
than actual tortious causes, is the situation in which two or more hunters 
negligently try to bring down a bird.16 Instead, one of the hunters shoots the 
victim.17 However, it is unknown who fired the injurious shot.18 This is 
usually referred to as a case of “alternative causation”—in the sense that 
each of the three hunters could be the cause of the accident.19 This exam-
ple, unlike the situations involving clear concurrent causation, introduces 
causal uncertainty, and the unanimity between the legal systems disappears.
One comparative analysis states that, although there are significant differ-
ences among the provided legal rationales, in the end, the victim will still 
have the possibility to claim compensation from any of the hunters in-
volved.20 The overview provided by the European Group on Tort Law 
states that most legal systems would impose joint and several liability on 
all of the hunters, although some jurisdictions doubt this approach.21
B. Basic Approach and Justifications
There is essentially unanimity across civil and common law jurisdic-
tions on treatment of cases in which various tortfeasors have knowingly 
acted in concert to produce the plaintiff’s injury: they will be jointly and 
severally liable. However, if they are acting independently of one another, 
things are more complicated.22 In those cases, almost all jurisdictions adopt 
a rule of joint and several liability if it can be proven that each defendant 
contributed to the entirety of the plaintiff’s injury, and most jurisdictions
also do so if it can be proven that each defendant contributed to at least part 
15. See Jaap Spier & Olav A. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, in UNIFICATION 
OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION, supra note 14, at 146–47.
16. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND 
COMMENTARY 48–49 (2005).
17. Id.
18. See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION, supra note 14, at 6.
19. Cooter and Ulen refer to this as an example of indivisible harm. See COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 13, at 383.
20. But under French law it would be based on a liability in solidum, whereas under English law 
the burden of proving lack of causation would be shifted to the defendant. See WALTER VAN GERVEN 
ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXTS ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT 
LAW 465 (2000); see also CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 286–90 (2006).
21. More particularly in Italy and in South Africa. See Spier & Haazen, supra note 15, at 154.
22. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16, at 45.
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of the plaintiff’s injury and it is impossible to prove who caused which 
portions of the plaintiff’s injury.23 The effect is that the victim can choose 
to sue any of the injurers (who fall within the joint and several liability 
regime) and claim full compensation from any of them.24 The injurer who 
had to fully compensate the victim can then in turn reclaim from the other 
tortfeasors in proportion to their comparative responsibility for the loss
based on relative causal contribution and fault.25 The plaintiff is not al-
lowed to recover more than full compensation (meaning more than 100% 
of the value of the harm).26
However, due to recent “tort reform” legislation, many states in the 
United States now take a quite different approach. Joint and several liabil-
ity of multiple tortfeasors (with a right of contribution among the tortfea-
sors) still exists in all cases in some states and in some cases in every state, 
especially for cases involving intentional torts, concerted action, or envi-
ronmental harms.27 But in most states multiple contributors to the same 
injury are now only held liable, especially for nonpecuniary harm, under 
widely varying rules for a fraction of the injury to which they tortiously 
contributed based on their comparative responsibility.28
This domain of tort law seems to be in full evolution since the Euro-
pean Group on Tort Law drafted several volumes on multiple tortfeasors,29
causation,30 and the Principles of European Tort Law.31 These publications 
provide the European Group’s ideas of what is or should be a common core 
of European tort law. More particularly, the Principles of European Tort 
Law represent, according to its drafters, a common denominator among
various European legal systems. For that reason, it is interesting to pay 
attention to those principles.
Causation and apportionment between multiple tortfeasors are highly 
debated issues, and are discussed both in legal doctrine and in the case law 
of different legal systems. Given the goal of this article, it would be too 
daunting to discuss this in significant detail. Therefore, this article will 
sketch the broad outlines of the conditions under which joint and several 
23. See id. at 142.
24. See id. 
25. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16, at 145–46.
26. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 384.
27. See Michael D. Green, Multiple Tortfeasors Under U.S. Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW:
MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 261, 261–62 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004).
28. Id. For a comparative overview see W.V. Horton Rogers, Comparative Report on Multiple 
Tortfeasors, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: MULTIPLE TORTFEASOR, supra note 27, at 272–73.
       29. Rogers, supra note 28, at 274.
30. See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION, supra note 14.
31. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16.
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liability applies under domestic tort law. Moreover, this article will briefly 
examine the justifications that are provided in European legal doctrine for 
joint and several liability.
There are a number of pragmatic and theoretical justifications provid-
ed in European legal doctrine. One is that all defendants are, by hypothesis, 
wrongdoers and that the risk of insolvency and other practical limits to 
recovery should fall on them rather than on the victim.32 In addition, W.V. 
Rogers, in an essay titled Comparative Report on Multiple Tortfeasors,
points to the fact that defendants may often be insured and that the insurer 
may have set premiums on the basis that its insured will be solely responsi-
ble for the damage.33 Finally, joint and several liability is also defended on 
the basis of equity and the need to guarantee the protection of victims.34
However, Rogers holds that this justification for joint and several liability 
may be weaker when the defendant is held liable under a strict liability 
theory. After all, under strict liability, the defendant is not necessarily a 
“wrongdoer.”35 Joint and several liability also becomes more complicated 
when the victim is at fault as well.36 This article will now address how 
multiple tortfeasors are dealt with in the Principles of European Tort Law
and on which basis contribution is possible between joint tortfeasors.
C. Principles of European Tort Law
It is worth discussing how the Principles of European Tort Law (the 
“Principles”) deals with some of the cases discussed above since it pro-
vides different answers for the case of concurring causes and other instanc-
es involving multiple tortfeasors.
In the case of concurring causes, Article 3:102 of the Principles states
that where each tortfeasor alone could have caused the damage at the same 
time, each activity is considered a cause of the victim’s damage.37 The 
commentary provides an interesting example: defendant 1 launches a long-
distance missile and defendant 2 a short-distance one. Both missiles hit the 
victim’s premises at the same time. The launching did not take place at the 
32. Rogers, supra note 28, at 274.
33. Id. (Whether these insurability arguments make sense from an economic perspective will be 
further discussed infra in Section IV, Part D).
34. Id. at 275.
35. Id.
36. Also Van Gerven et al. holds that an exception to the principle of joint and several liability 
exists where the victim was also at fault in which case the liability of the defendant will be directly 
reduced to take into account the fault of the plaintiff. See VaN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 464–
65.
37. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16, at 44.
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same time; however, the missiles hit the target concurrently. The fact that 
the damage is caused at the same time is decisive. Since each activity could 
have caused the entire loss, even in the absence of the other, the persons 
liable for the respective activities are liable in full.38 This is a case where 
two or more events are conditiones sine quibus non39 for the loss. In this 
example, the European Group opts for solidary liability.40 Hence, the arti-
cles of the Principles on concurrent causes also refer to the articles on soli-
dary liability.41 However, a different solution is stated in the case of causal 
uncertainty. This occurs where two or more causes may or may not have 
caused a loss.42 There is uncertainty about whether or not the respective 
events do fulfill the conditio sine qua non requirement.43 In this second 
example, the European Group opts for proportional liability. This is clear 
from Article 3:103 of the Principles, referred to as alternative causes.44
There are concurrent causes in the example of two companies emitting 
wastewater causing harm to a state downstream, and hence solidary liabil-
ity would apply according to Article 3:102. However, in the case of the 
three hunters where there is causal uncertainty, the Principles would apply 
proportional liability, meaning that each of the hunters will be liable for 
one-third of the loss.45
Chapter 9 of the Principles enumerates the conditions of solidary lia-
bility, which correspond largely with the situations mentioned above in 
which almost all or many jurisdictions adopt joint and several liability.
According to Article 9:101, liability is solidary where:
a. a person knowingly participates in or instigates or encourages wrong-
doing by others which causes damage to the victim; or
b. one person’s independent behavior or activity causes damage to the 
victim and the same damage is also attributable to another person.
38. Id. at 45.
39. The Latin phrase that a particular event should be condition sine qua non of the loss indicates 
that without the event the loss would not have occurred. In the English language this is sometimes 
described as “but for” the event the victim’s loss would not have occurred.
40. Joint and several liability is referred to as solidary liability by the European Group on Tort 
Law. 
41. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16, at 47.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id.
44. Art. 3:103(1) reads, “In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have been 
sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each activity is 
regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s
damage.” Id. at 47.
45. Id. at 48–49.
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c. a person is responsible for damage caused by an auxiliary in circum-
stances where the auxiliary is also liable.46
Article 9:101(2) explains what the consequences of solidary liability 
are: “The victim may claim full compensation from any one or more of 
them, provided that the victim may not recover more than the full amount 
of the damage suffered by him.”47
The Principles only make an exception to solidary liability for the 
case where damage caused by each tortfeasor would not be “the same dam-
age.”48 Article 9:101(3) holds that the damage attributed to each tortfeasor 
is the same when there is no reasonable basis for attributing only part of it 
to each of the persons liable to the victim.49 The party asserting that dam-
ages are not the same has the burden of proving this.50 If that burden is 
satisfied, liability will be several, meaning that each person is liable to the 
victim only for the part of the damage attributable to him.
Summarizing this discussion, the common core of European domestic 
tort law systems shows that joint and several liability is accepted in specific 
cases where tortfeasors have acted together to cause one, indivisible 
harm.51 However, due to “tort reform,” U.S. law evinces a much more 
diversified picture. Moreover, the unanimity among European jurisdictions
disappears when causal uncertainty is introduced (as in the three hunters 
case).
D. Contributions Between Tortfeasors
The treatment of concurrent liability so far deals with the “external” 
aspect, that is, the relationship between the various tortfeasors and the vic-
tim. However, another related (and obvious) question arises: how does one 
deal with recourse between the tortfeasors, sometimes referred to as the 
“internal” aspect?52 Legal systems differ on the basis for recovery. The 
question centers on the basis on which one tortfeasor, who has fully com-
pensated the victim, can recover from the other tortfeasors. Some legal 
systems base this on an independent right of recourse; others hold that the 
tortfeasor who paid the victim is able to exercise the rights of the victim
(this is referred to as subrogation); others even call on the law of unjust 




50. Art. 9:101(3) of the Principles of European Tort Law states: “For this purpose it is for the 
person asserting that the damage is not the same to show that it is not.” Id. 
51. See id. at 143–45.
52. Rogers, supra note 28, at 292.
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enrichment.53 In some legal systems, specific provisions exclude or restrict 
the recourse action. For example, in the United States, a recourse action is 
not available for an intentional wrongdoer.54
In principle, the amount of recourse should correspond to the relative
causal contribution or comparative responsibility (based on relative fault as 
well as causal contribution) if it differs between the tortfeasors. Suppose 
that the full loss of the victim was $3,000 and that tortfeasor 1’s relative 
causal contribution or comparative responsibility was 20% while tortfeasor 
2’s was 80%. The victim claims compensation in full from tortfeasor 2, 
who thereby compensates the victim with $3,000. In this example, tortfea-
sor 2 can only claim recourse for 20% of $3,000 (a total of $600) from 
tortfeasor 1.55 This is the solution in the United States,56 and it seems to be 
the solution in most legal systems.57 The same solution follows if there is a 
risk of insolvency by one of the contributors. The failure of a solidary 
debtor to fulfill his obligation (because of insolvency) is substituted by his 
co-debtors, pro rata to the amount of debt owed by each of them.58 Under 
this system, the internal liability (contribution via recourse) is based on the 
comparative responsibility of each contributor. That comparative responsi-
bility will also determine each tortfeasor’s contribution in case one of them 
is insolvent.
Article 9:102 of the Principles also deals with the internal aspect, i.e. 
the obligation to contribute to other tortfeasors. Article 9:102(4) holds that 
“the obligation to make the contribution is several”.59 That means that the 
person subject to contribution is only liable for his apportioned share of 
comparative responsibility. If it is not possible to enforce a judgment of 
contribution against one tortfeasor (e.g. in a case of insolvency), that share 
is to be reallocated among the other persons liable in proportion to their 
comparative responsibility.60 This rule corresponds with the common core 
of European domestic tort law systems as explained above.
53. Id.
54. See Green, supra note 27, at 264.
55. Rogers, supra note 28, at 299.
56. Green, supra note 27, at 263–64.
57. Id.
58. Rogers, supra note 28, at 300.
59. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 16, at 142.
60. Id. at 145–46.
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IV. MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
At first blush, a joint and several liability rule appears to deviate from 
the principle that a tortfeasor should only be held liable for the damage 
caused by his own behavior. However, as discussed above, under joint and 
several liability each tortfeasor is only held liable for damages that it 
caused. The fact that others also contributed to the same injury provides an 
equitable basis for contribution claims among the multiple contributors to 
the injury but does not lessen any tortfeasor’s status as a cause of (contribu-
tor to) the entirety of the injury.
One could, therefore, from an economic perspective, argue that a joint 
and several liability system is inefficient since it leads to over-deterrence;
the injurer’s liability is not limited to the risk created by its own activity. 
However, such a simple conclusion is, indeed, too simple. One may argue 
that a distinction should be made between the situation of full solvency of 
all the contributing tortfeasors on the one hand and the situation in which 
either one or more of them are insolvent.61
Given this difference, the following section first discusses how the 
basic model assumes that all tortfeasors are fully solvent. It then explains 
the difference between the strict liability and negligence rules. Lastly, this 
section examines the situation of insolvency and how insurability may be 
affected by differing regimes.
A. Full Solvency: Basic Model
In the case where all actors are fully solvent, one can argue that there 
is no efficiency loss caused by joint and several liability.62 The injurer who 
has to compensate the victim can, in turn, exercise a redress against the 
other parties who contributed to the loss in proportion to their contribu-
tion.63 From an economic perspective, it is important to charge each tort-
61. See Pierre Widmer, Causation Under Swiss Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION,
supra note 14, at 112–13 (noting that joint and several liability amounts to a shifting of the risk of 
insolvency to the joint tortfeasors).
62. See Lewis Kornhauser & Richard Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 
YALE L.J. 831, 831–84 (1989) for a detailed analysis of joint and several liability when all defendants 
are fully solvent, and Lewis Kornhauser & Richard Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Potentially 
Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617, 617–51 (1990) for analysis in case of limited solvency. See 
also Lewis Kornhauser & Richard Revesz, Joint Tortfeasors, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 625, 625–43 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 
2000); Lewis Kornhauser & Richard Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW 371, 371–76 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
63. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic 
Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 524 (1980); SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 164–65.
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feasor precisely the amount that he has contributed to the risk in order to 
provide efficient incentives for prevention to all contributing actors.
Moreover, the advantage of a joint and several liability rule is that it 
may provide incentives for mutual monitoring between tortfeasors.64 Since 
the risk that one liable operator would have to contribute would also de-
pend on the likelihood that others commit torts, joint and several liability 
would give incentives to operators to mutually monitor the care levels ex-
ercised and could thus add to prevention. However, obvious questions 
arise: to what extent do operators have possibilities for such a mutual moni-
toring and will they actually have possibilities to do so? For example, in a 
relatively small-scale pollution case, where various actors contribute to a 
landfill, this ex ante mutual monitoring may be possible. But in other, 
large-scale cases involving many potential tortfeasors, the administrative 
costs of such a mutual monitoring may be prohibitive.
Joint and several liability also has an advantage because it provides 
incentives to the victim to sue. In a case of several liability, which would 
require the victim to sue every tortfeasor separately, the costs for bringing 
the suit may be prohibitive. Given the rational apathy and cost aversion of 
tort victims,65 requiring a victim to sue each contributing tortfeasor sepa-
rately will increase barriers to justice. It also increases the likelihood that 
tortfeasors will not be confronted with the social cost of their activity. Joint 
and several liability reduces cost for the victims and therefore increases the 
likelihood that tortfeasors are confronted with the externalities they cause.66
Assuming that the other tortfeasors are fully solvent, the effect of joint 
and several liability is that the one who first paid only pre-finances the 
compensation of the victim and will be able to recover a part of the damage 
paid.67 Thus, in the end, under joint and several liability, the extent to 
which every contributor has to pay should be proportionate to his contribu-
tion. For this economic approach to tort law to work, it is essential that the 
tortfeasor is proportionally exposed to the accident costs to the extent that 
he contributed to the risk.68 In that sense, a joint and several liability rule, 
combined with a right of recourse and solvent actors, amounts to a propor-
64. This argument is especially made in Tom H. Tietenberg, Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Eco-
nomics of Joint and Several Liability, 65 LAND ECON. 305, 315 (1989).
65. See Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests on Litigation. The Incentives for 
Class Actions and Legal Actions taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 183 (2000).
66. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 384.
67. See Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 530.
68. See Robert Young et al., Causality and Causation in Tort Law, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
507, 518–20 (2004), and Robert Young et al., Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, in 3 REV. L.
& ECON. 111, 111–32 (2007) for a more detailed analysis of different factual circumstances. 
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tionate solution. The exposure to liability of every tortfeasor in this model 
is limited to its own contribution to the loss. Thus, optimal incentives will 
follow, at least under a negligence regime.69
One could also question whether joint and several liability leads to 
lower or higher administrative costs than the alternative of just several 
liability. At first glance, there is no major difference between both rules. In 
the case of solidary liability, the victim only has to bring one lawsuit 
against the defendant of his choice, which lowers administrative costs. 
However, since the one tortfeasor who is sued by the victim will subse-
quently exercise recourse, those subsequent recourse actions will also lead 
to litigation costs. In the case of several liability, the victim has to bring a 
lawsuit against all responsible tortfeasors, which could lead to higher ad-
ministrative costs. It can be argued that the costs of the actions in recourse 
by the defendant (for example, a corporate defendant) may be lower than 
the victim’s cost to sue all primary tortfeasors since recourse should not 
necessarily take place via litigation. Rather, it could result from settlements 
between the various defendants who are liable on a solidary basis. If there 
were reasons to believe that recourse actions could be exercised at lower 
costs than the victim’s litigated case, solidary liability may lead to lower 
administrative costs.
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, in their article titled Total Liability for 
Excessive Harm, proposed one original solution: hold all contributing tort-
feasors liable for only all of the excessive harm that every tortfeasor caus-
es.70 With excessive harm, Cooter and Porat refer to the difference 
between the total harm caused by all injurers and the optimal total harm.71
This rule of total liability for excessive harm creates, they argue, incentives 
for efficient precaution and activity level.72 Actual harm will not be exces-
sive and as a result, actual liability will be nil.73 However, this rule of total 
liability for excessive harm only has practical advantages if: (1) total harm 
is verifiable, (2) optimal harm is calculable, and (3) the number of injurers 
is not too large.74
69. Louis T. Visscher, Tort Damages, in 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 153,
179.
70. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 64 
(2007).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id. at 64, 78.
74. Id. at 64. See also Visscher, supra note 69, at 179–80, for a summary.
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B. Strict Liability Versus Negligence
As far as the efficiency of joint and several liability is concerned, lit-
erature distinguishes between the situations of strict liability and negli-
gence. Under strict liability with contribution between tortfeasors, a 
tortfeasor is only exposed to part of the accident costs. The tortfeasor is no 
longer responsible for the full accident costs, causing possible inefficien-
cy.75 This problem could be solved by having no contribution between the 
tortfeasors and allowing full recovery by the victim against all contributing 
tortfeasors. This would have the benefit of exposing all tortfeasors to the 
full costs of their activity, but it obviously has the disadvantage of poten-
tially frivolous law suits on behalf of victims.76 The same problems do not 
arise in negligence cases, as long as the due care required in the relevant 
legal system is equal to the optimal care to internalize the externality.77
Turning to the question of contribution, the legal basis for such a con-
tribution may, from an economic perspective, either be a strict liability rule 
or a negligence rule.78 Generally, strict liability is preferred where a unilat-
eral act is concerned (i.e. where only the tortfeasor influenced the harm and 
the victim could not reduce the accident risk) or where an ultra-hazardous 
activity is involved.79 Both strict liability and negligence can provide po-
tential tortfeasors with incentives to take efficient care, but in such a unilat-
eral ultra-hazardous situation, strict liability has the advantage of providing 
injurers equally with incentives to adopt an efficient activity level.80 For 
example, in a product liability case, this would refer to the number of prod-
ucts produced. In a traffic accident, it would refer to the number of miles 
driven.81 Strict liability has the advantage of providing both incentives to 
adopt efficient care as well as an efficient activity level to the potential 
injurer.82 The contributing actors on whom recourse is exercised will be 
equally exposed to appropriate incentives via either a strict liability or a 
75. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 384; Visscher, supra note 69, at 178.
76. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 385.
77. Visscher, supra note 69, at 179.
78. See Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, supra note 4, at 1–25, for the difference 
between both systems and the conditions under which strict liability is preferred over negligence and 
Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Frank Müller-Langer, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, in 1 TORT LAW &
ECONOMICS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 3–45 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009), for a 
recent summary.
79. See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra note 81, at 21 (stating that strict liability only implies 
that there should be no fault or negligence as a basis for the recourse, but obviously not that the (strictly 
liable) tortfeasor would (in the internal relationship) have to pay more than his own share).
80. The activity level refers to the number of times that the injurer engages in the activity.
81. See Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 107 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 109 (1974).
82. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 
GA. L. REV. 851, 875 (1981).
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negligence rule. Recall, however, that under strict liability the problem of 
under-deterrence could arise since not all contributing tortfeasors are ex-
posed to the full costs of their activity.83
C. Insolvency
The analysis presented above may not be valid under insolvency.84
The same problems arise as under strict liability, discussed supra, when 
insolvent tortfeasors are involved.85 For that matter, one can equate the 
situation of insolvency to any situation where a claim against particular 
defendants is impossible, for example, because they have disappeared or 
become judgment proof. Indeed, the picture changes if the other tortfeasors 
can no longer be sued. The risk of non-recovery from other tortfeasors is de
facto shifted to the one injurer who will be sued by the victim. If in that 
particular case one would assume that only the solvent injurer is sued by 
the victim and he has no right of recourse (given the insolvency of the oth-
ers), the effect would be that one (solvent) injurer would be held to com-
pensate for losses which he has not caused.86 In cases involving insolvency 
or the general impossibility of recovery from any of the other tortfeasors, 
joint and several liability may violate the principle that the injurer should 
only be held liable to compensate in the proportion to which he contributed 
to the loss.87
The problem with insolvency is that joint and several liability may not 
lead to more care by the remaining (solvent) injurers. However, there may 
be an effect on activity level. The activity level may be reduced, or elimi-
nated altogether, because liability costs for damages caused by other tort-
feasors would be crippling; thus reducing the incentives of particular 
operators to engage in certain activities that are considered socially desira-
83. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in 1 TORT LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 122.
84. See James Boyd & Daniel Ingberman, The Vertical Extension of Environmental Liability 
through Claims of Ownership, Contact & Supply, in THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
44, 44–65 (Anthony Heyes ed., 2001) for an excellent analysis of the effects of various systems of 
extended liability and the assertion that under certain conditions extended liability may promote cost 
internalization, but that there are serious drawbacks as well. Hence, they argue that other solutions 
should be examined to cure the problem of undercapitalization.
85. See Visscher, supra note 69, at 179.
86. Joint and several liability would then lead to over-deterrence. See BERGKAMP, supra note 9,
at 301.
87. See Lucas Bergkamp, The Proper Scope of Joint and Several Liability, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
MILIEUSCHADE EN AANSPRAKELIJKHEIDRECHT 154, 154–55 (2000) for an argument that joint and 
several liability may be unfair and may lead to over-deterrence.
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ble.88 In this instance, joint and several liability may amount to over-
deterrence.
Over-deterrence is a strong argument against joint and several liability 
in the case of potentially insolvent injurers. However, whether the legisla-
ture introduces several (or proportional) liability in order to avoid a crip-
pling liability on operators is ultimately a policy choice since it obviously 
has important distributional consequences. Legislators will have to decide 
whether the insolvency risk will lay with potential victims or with opera-
tors. Solidary liability shifts the insolvency risk to operators, with the po-
tential danger of a crushing liability and a reduced activity level below 
socially desirable levels. However, the alternative of several (proportional) 
liability forces the victim to sue all tortfeasors who contributed to the risk. 
If one of those tortfeasors is insolvent, the insolvency risk then remains 
with the victim. Whether the risk of injurer insolvency should remain with 
operators or with victims cannot be answered solely on economic grounds, 
since it may have important distributional consequences as well. It is pre-
cisely because of those distributional consequences that many legislatures
have introduced solidary liability, thus shifting insolvency risks from oper-
ators to victims.
D. Insurability
Within the domestic tort context, there is yet another dimension which 
is often added to the debate: joint and several liability is often considered 
an expansion of traditional tort liability.89 Such an expansion of liability is, 
according to some scholars, dangerous since it could endanger the insura-
bility of liability risks.90 This fits into the idea that domestic tort liability 
should remain within limits of insurability because stretching the bounda-
ries of tort liability could potentially lead to an insurance crisis.91 Within 
that context, a question has been asked: what is the effect of joint and sev-
eral liability in domestic tort law on the insurability of liability risks? From 
an insurance perspective, some have warned against joint and several liabil-
88. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 164 for further information on the 
crushing effect of joint and several liability; see Bergkamp, supra note 87, at 153–55.
89. See, inter alia, Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern 
North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 929, 959 (1987).
90. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 942, 942–88 (1988); Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Envi-
ronmental Risks, J. RISK & INS. 75, 75–100 (1988).
91. This argument has especially been strongly defended by George L. Priest, The Current Insur-
ance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, YALE L. J. 1521, 1521–90 (1987).
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ity because the insurer is no longer merely insuring the risk created by his 
insured individual (which he can still control), but also the risk caused by 
all others.92 Joint and several liability then amounts to a system where in-
surers can no longer accurately calculate premiums93 and may have diffi-
culties in correctly calculating the amount of reserves to be set aside.94 This 
problem especially arises in the case where no recourse is possible because 
other contributing tortfeasors cannot be found or are insolvent and there-
fore judgment proof. One important condition for insurability is that the 
insurer needs to be able to predict the risk (i.e. the probability that an acci-
dent may occur multiplied with the damage caused by his insured).95 Under 
joint and several liability with insolvency of contributing partners, there is 
a risk that insurers may not only cover the damage caused by their insured, 
but de facto cover the entire market.96 Since, under joint and several liabil-
ity, insurers may not know whether their insured will be able to exercise 
recourse (in which case his liability exposure may effectively be limited to 
the extent that he contributed to the risk), civil liability under joint and 
several liability becomes unpredictable and hence uninsurable.97
Although this argument about uninsurability of joint and several liabil-
ity is repeated often in the literature,98 from a purely theoretical perspec-
tive, it is not so clear why solidary liability would be uninsurable. 
Theoretically, for example, if all companies in the market are exposed to 
solidary liability and both tortfeasors and insurance companies are aware of 
this, this could lead to a higher probability that the insurance company of 
one operator will have to compensate not only for the damage caused by its 
insured, but also for damage caused by other insureds. However, the same 
risk would not only exist for that one operator, but presumably for all oth-
92. See Herman Cousy, Recent Developments in Environmental Insurance, in RECENT ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 235, 235–37 (Filip Abraham et al. 
eds., 1995).
93. Since they are no longer merely insuring the risk caused by their insured, but potentially by 
others as well. 
94. MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMIC RISKS 127 
(2003).
95. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 197–248 (2012).
96. See J. Han Wansink, Het DES-arrest in het perspectief van verzekerbare slachtof-
ferbescherming, AANSPRAKELIJKHEID EN VERZEKERING 7–12 (1993) for a point made by the Dutch 
insurance expert Wansink who held that joint and several liability leads to an insurer de facto covering 
the liability insurance for the entire market, which according to him amounts to uninsurability of the 
risks.
97. See, inter alia, Bergkamp, supra note 87, at 154.
98. See, inter alia, FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 94, at 126–27; Michael Faure, Causal Uncer-
tainty, Joint and Several Liability and Insurance, in LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE WIDMER 79, 79–98 
(Helmut Koziol & Jaap Spier eds., 2003).
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ers as well. In other words, there is, on the one hand, a probability of the 
insurer having to cover damage not caused by its insured, but there is an 
equal likelihood that the insured will not be bound to compensate even 
though he caused (part of the) damage. Theoretically, those probabilities 
could cancel each other out and, as a result, the total risk exposure for cor-
porate defendants and their insurers should not necessarily increase. From a 
practical perspective, however, it may be extremely difficult for an insurer 
to calculate ex ante probabilities necessary to fix actuarially fair premiums. 
The insurer would not only have to take into account the risk caused by its 
own insured, but also the likelihood that either the insured would have to 
pay for losses caused by others or that others would cover part of the losses 
caused by its insured. From a pragmatic perspective, it could therefore be 
held that joint and several liability may increase the ex ante administrative 
costs for insurers to calculate probability and therefore also increase actuar-
ially fair premiums.
E. Summary
The economic approach to tort law distinguishes two situations as far 
as joint and several liability is concerned. The first situation assumes that 
all tortfeasors can be identified, can be sued in a recourse action, and are 
solvent. Joint and several liability in that particular case creates no prob-
lem—at least in the context of the negligence rule:
? The fact that the victim only brings one suit could reduce ad-
ministrative costs, if the costs of recourse actions between de-
fendants were lower than the costs for the victim to sue all 
liable injurers;
? Joint and several liability can provide incentives for mutual 
monitoring;
? Via the recourse action, an attribution among the different tort-
feasors is possible on the basis of their own contribution to the 
risk; and
? A correct allocation of risk is possible and optimal incentives 
for deterrence are provided.
The second situation—in which an economic perspective on joint and 
several liability is far more problematic—involves either a strict liability 
rule, an insolvency risk, or potential tortfeasors that could not be identified 
(and hence against whom no recourse would be possible). That case creates 
problems:
? Joint and several liability may not lead to a correct allocation of 
social costs;
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? It leads potentially to over-deterrence of the one tortfeasor who 
is sued; it may potentially lead to a so-called crushing liability;
? It may equally lead to insurability problems; and
? A proportional liability rule would, in that case, be preferred.
V. CHANNELING OF LIABILITY
We now turn to a situation, which in a way is the mirror image of sol-
idary liability, in that there is the exclusive legal channeling of liability to 
one responsible tortfeasor. First, a few examples are provided. Next, the 
main reasons and justifications are explained and the recourse between 
different parties is discussed. An analysis of channeling from an economic 
perspective follows as well as a discussion of insurability aspects.
A. Examples
Another feature can be found in some liability statutes, mostly because 
of international conventions, where a deviation from the principle that only 
the injurer who caused the damage should be held fully liable for the loss.99
This concerns the so-called channeling of liability. Whereas with joint and 
several liability a victim can in principle claim full compensation from any 
of the multiple injurers, channeling is the reverse. Under channeling, the 
liability is attached to one party who becomes fully liable for the dam-
age.100 Channeling is often exclusive. Channeling statutes indicate which 
(of many possible) parties can be held liable for the loss.101 The result is 
that the victim can only sue the “channeled” injurer and not another party 
who might have contributed to the loss.
As already indicated above, channeling of liability can be found in in-
ternational conventions with respect to nuclear liability and marine pollu-
tion.102 For example, under the Paris Convention on Nuclear Liability,
liability is channeled to operators.103 According to the Convention, no one 
99. HUI WANG, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A COMPARATIVE AND 
ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, U.S. & CHINESE COMPENSATION REGIME 82 (2011) (“It is 
a deviation from the general principle of tort law that the tortfeasor who caused damage should be held 
liable. “).
100. See id. at 82–83 for a discussion of channeling in the nuclear industry and in cases of oil 
pollution.
101. See id. at 82 (“It means that only the statutory channeled party shall be exclusively liable for 
the damage and the other parties are excluded from the liability.”).
102. See JING LIU, COMPENSATION FOR ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC 
OBSERVATIONS 212 (2013) and PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 738–45 (3d ed. 2012) for a discussion of channelling under the nuclear liability 
conventions. 
103. See LIU, supra note 102, at 212; SANDS ET AL., supra note 102, at 739.
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is liable for the damage caused by a nuclear accident but the operator.104
The “operator” is defined as “the person designated or recognised by the 
competent public authority as the operator of that installation.”105 The 
Paris Convention is the only legal basis for a claim against the nuclear 
operator in case of an incident.106 Additionally, the Convention on the Lia-
bility of Operators of Nuclear Ships of Brussels107 held that “except as oth-
erwise provided in this Convention no person other than the operator shall 
be liable for such nuclear damage.”108 The 1969 International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (“1969 CLC”) created a chan-
neling of liability for oil pollution damage to the tanker owner.109 The tank-
er owner is defined as “the person or persons registered as the owner of the 
ship or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons owning the 
ship.”110 The application of all other legislation is pre-empted; no claims 
are possible other than those under the Convention.111 Claims against serv-
ants or agents of the owner are explicitly excluded.112 It is debatable wheth-
er this list of persons against whom no claim is possible still allows the 
possibility of claims against other parties. For example, some argue that 
claims against a cargo owner and operator would still be possible according 
to applicable national laws.113 Additionally, the Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea Convention channels liability to the owner of the ship, 
defined as the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or the 
person or persons owning the ship.114
104. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy art. VI(a), July 29, 1960, 
956 U.N.T.S. 251. 
105. Id. art. I(a)(vi). 
106. Id. art. VI(c)(ii). 
107. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT’L L.
268 (1963).
108. Id. art. II(2). 
109. See LIU, supra note 102, at 196–99; SANDS ET. AL., supra note 102, at 746–47; WANG, supra
note 99, at 87.
110. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art. I(3), Nov. 29, 1969, 
972 U.N.T.S. 3. 
111. See WANG, supra note 99, at 87–88.
112. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 110, art. 
III(4). 
113. Albert Verheij, Shifts in Governance: Oil Pollution, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 133, 141 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 2007).
114. See International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, art. I(3), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1415
(1996).
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B. Reasons and Justifications
In the Paris Convention on Nuclear Liability, two formal reasons are 
advanced in favor of the channeling of liability: first, to avoid the compli-
cated legal procedures to identify the liable parties and second, to allow a 
concentration of insurance capacity.115 Additionally, literature defends the 
channeling of liability as affording a guarantee of prompt compensation to 
the victim and facilitating the transfer of prevention and liability costs to 
the price of goods.116 Julio Barboza holds, “channeling of liability towards 
determined categories of persons is a rational way of achieving risk mini-
mization,”117 and, “channeling liability affords a guarantee of prompt com-
pensation to the victims and facilitates the transfer of prevention and 
liability costs to the price of goods.”118 However, in reality, channeling was 
likely not introduced to defend the interests of the victim, but rather the 
interests of industry. In his dissertation, Tom Vanden Borre powerfully 
demonstrated that channeling was introduced in the nuclear liability con-
ventions at the request of American suppliers of nuclear fuel.119 The legal 
technique was needed to assure the American suppliers that liability suits 
would never be brought against them, but instead would be brought exclu-
sively against the (European) operators of the power plants.120
Looking at the legal history of the nuclear liability conventions, there 
seems to be some support for the justification provided by Vanden Borre. 
At the beginning of the development of the nuclear industry, the Western-
European market had to rely on American suppliers and technology.121 The 
American nuclear industry, however, was unwilling to bear liability for 
possible nuclear accidents in Europe.122 Therefore, a “hold-harmless” 
clause was introduced in the first bilateral agreements between the United 
States and Europe, which required the European nuclear operators to in-
demnify the American suppliers for all claims resulting from their activi-
115. Exposé des Motifs, Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251. 
116. See, inter alia, JULIO BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 32–33 (2011).
117. Id. at 42.
118. Id. at 32–33.
119. Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 20 Years 
after Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 113, 262, 
262–66.
120. See TOM VANDEN BORRE, EFFICIËNTE PREVENTIE EN COMPENSATIE VAN
CATASTROFERISICO’S: HET VOORBEELD VAN SCHADE DOOR KERNONGEVALLEN 237–50 (2001).
121. See Vanden Borre, supra note 119, at 262.
122. See id. at 261–62.
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ties.123 Even with those “hold-harmless” clauses, the American industry 
was still unsure whether the agreements could provide sufficient protection, 
and the U.S. Atomic Industrial Forum conducted a comprehensive study on 
the possibility of European victims claiming against American suppliers in 
the case of a nuclear incident.124 Two reports were published later by the 
Atomic Industrial Forum: the Preliminary Report on Financial Protection 
Against Atomic Hazards (“the Preliminary Report”)125 and the Internation-
al Problems of Financial Protection Against Nuclear Risk (“the Harvard 
Report”).126 Those two reports developed principles for nuclear liability, 
which were later incorporated into the international conventions.
The Preliminary Report identified four parties who can be affected by 
nuclear risks: the nuclear industry, private insurers, the government, and 
the victims of a potential nuclear accident.127 In this report, the liability of 
the nuclear industry is linked with insurance capacity; for the part of dam-
age that cannot be compensated by the insurer, the government needs to
provide additional compensation to protect the victims.128 The Preliminary 
Report introduced a system of unlimited government intervention: any 
damage in excess of the limitation of liable parties’ liability should be cov-
ered by the government in terms of indemnity.129
The channeling of liability to nuclear operators was advised in the 
Harvard Report.130 According to the Harvard Report, the suppliers and 
contractors were exempted from liability for the following reasons: the 
suppliers were afraid of being held liable instead of or jointly with the op-
erators and then being burdened by the lengthy trials; suppliers would lose 
control after the delivery of goods and services; and operators were more 
capable of obtaining insurance.131
This shows that channeling of liability to the operator was mainly an 
instrument to protect (American) suppliers of nuclear material. It can, 
therefore, largely be considered as an instrument of interest group politics, 
123. Tom Vanden Borre, Nuclear Liability: An Anachronism in EU Energy Policy?, in EUROPEAN 
ENERGY LAW REPORT VII 180 (Martha M. Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010).
124. Vanden Borre, supra note 119, at 262–63.
125. Prepared by the experts of Columbia University and published in March 1956. ARTHUR W.
MURPHY, ATOMIC INDUS. FORUM, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST 
ATOMIC HAZARDS (1956).
126. Prepared by Harvard Law School and published in 1959. HARVARD LAW SCH., ATOMIC 
INDUS. FORUM, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK
(1959).
127. Vanden Borre, supra note 119, at 263.
128. Id. at 264.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 265–66.
131. Id. at 261, 265–66.
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rather than as an instrument either protecting the interests of victims or 
promoting the optimal working of accident law.
It is also interesting to mention that this channeling of liability was 
first introduced, as discussed supra, in the conventions related to nuclear 
liability and was later copied in other international conventions.132 In a 
historical overview concerning the development of the channeling of liabil-
ity, Hui Wang, in her book titled Civil Liability for Marine Oil Pollution 
Damage: A Comparative and Economic Study of the International, U.S. 
and Chinese Compensation Regime, demonstrates how the existence of the 
channeling of liability in the nuclear industry had a strong influence on the 
introduction of channeling in the marine oil pollution conventions as 
well.133
C. Recourse
There are some differences between the international conventions as 
far as the possibility of recourse is concerned. Under the Paris Convention 
on Nuclear Liability, the operators, in principle, do not have a right of re-
course against the other parties.134 It is argued that allowing recourse will 
make it necessary for suppliers to seek insurance coverage and will lead to 
costly duplication of insurance.135 However, recourse is possible if the 
damage results from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage 
or, if and to the extent, provided by contract.136 The Vienna Convention
also has similar provisions.137 Under the 1969 CLC, recourse against a third 
party is allowed.138
D. Analysis
An argument often used to defend channeling is that it makes victims’
lives much easier since they no longer have to investigate who precisely is 
132. See WANG, supra note 99, at 82–87.
133. See id. at 82–88; Hui Wang, Shifts in Governance in the International Regime of Marine Oil 
Pollution Compensation: A Legal History Perspective, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 113, at 224–27.
134. See LIU, supra note 102, at 212.
135. Expose des Motifs, Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, supra 
note 115.
136. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, supra note 104, art. 
VI(f); see also LIU, supra note 102, at 212.
137. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage art. X, May 21, 1963, 1063 
U.N.T.S. 265.
138. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 110, art. 
III(5).
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the liable injurer (in case of an accident with multiple injurers).139 The stat-
ute indeed simplifies the victim’s life by indicating that he can only sue the 
injurer to which liability is channeled. Thus, one could argue that channel-
ing leads to a reduction of transaction costs.140 However, this hardly seems 
valid. The additional benefit of channeling for the victim is limited; the 
costs of discovering that it is the licensee of a nuclear power plant, for ex-
ample, who may be primarily liable are not that high. Contrast this with the 
huge disadvantages for the victim: he no longer can possibly claim his 
damage from other parties who may have contributed to the loss as well. 
From a victim’s perspective, one may well argue that joint and several 
liability is preferable. In that case, the victim can simply sue any of the 
available injurers and claim full compensation.
One possible economic explanation for the phenomenon of legal 
channeling is the notion of the “cheapest cost avoider.” Guido Calabresi, in 
his book titled The Costs of Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis,
held that the costs have to be allocated to the party who could reduce the 
costs as cheaply as possible.141 One could argue that the legislature identi-
fied a particular operator (like the licensee of a nuclear power plant) as the 
“cheapest cost avoider” and thus allocated liability to that particular person. 
However, the “cheapest cost avoider” was never meant to imply that if one 
particular party could be identified as the cheapest cost avoider, that this 
would necessarily exclude liability of all others who could influence the 
accident risk, as is the case in legal channeling of liability.
There are, indeed, substantial disadvantages to channeling of liability. 
Several scholars have argued that this regime of channeling is inefficient 
from an economic perspective, at least if one believes that an exposure to 
liability provides incentives for prevention.142 In particular, the fact that 
channeling leads to sole liability of the operator, with the exclusion of lia-
bility suits against third-party contributors, is heavily criticized.143 Indeed, 
139. See BARBOZA, supra note 116, at 32.
140. See VANDEN BORRE, supra note 120, at 698–99.
141. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 140–44.
142. With respect to the channeling for oil pollution damage, see Michael Faure & Wang Hui, 
Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 179, 187–89 
(2006). As far as channeling of nuclear liability is concerned, see Tom Vanden Borre, Channeling of 
Liability: A Few Juridical and Economic Views on an Inadequate Legal Construction, in
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW, HARMONIZING LEGISLATION IN 
CEEC/NIS 13 (Nathalie Horbach ed., 1999).
143. For a critical economic analysis of the channeling of nuclear liability see Tom Vanden Borre, 
Transplantatie van ‘kanalisatie van aansprakelijkheid’ van het kernenergie recht naar het milieu 
(aansprakelijkheids)recht: een goede of een gebrekkige zaak?, in IUS COMMUNE EN MILIEURECHT,
ACTUALIA IN HET MILIEURECHT IN BELGIË EN NEDERLAND 329, 329–82 (Michael Faure & Kurt 
Deketelaere eds., 1997) and VANDEN BORRE, supra note 120, at 693–701.
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one can imagine situations—for instance in nuclear accident cases—where 
another party has contributed to the loss as well (perhaps the person who 
may have delivered defective nuclear material that contributed to the loss). 
Exclusive channeling means that the victim no longer has the right to sue 
another party who could have influenced the risk of accident.144 The effect 
is, of course, that the victim’s claim may not be fully satisfied. Hence, one 
could criticize channeling from a distributive perspective. Moreover, the 
third party who has contributed to the loss should be exposed to liability in 
order to give him incentives for prevention. If the effect of the channeling 
is that the third party is no longer liable, it is clearly inefficient.
Channeling may have this effect, especially in the nuclear case, since 
the liability of the nuclear power plant licensee (to which liability is chan-
neled) is also limited because financial caps are introduced on the victim’s 
compensation. Channeling requires the victim to exclusively sue the licen-
see of the power plant, where he is confronted with a financial cap. The 
victim has no opportunity to bring another lawsuit if, because of the cap, 
his damage was not fully compensated. A suit based on tort law against the 
licensee for the amount not covered by the cap is usually excluded in do-
mestic law and a suit against a third liable party is usually excluded due to 
the channeling.145
Exclusive channeling in the international conventions means that the 
victim can, in principle, only file a law suit against the indicated person, 
e.g. the licensee (in case of nuclear accidents) or the tanker owner (in case 
of marine oil pollution). In that sense, the channeling is “exclusive” since a 
claim against other parties is (usually) not allowed. However, exclusive 
channeling does not mean that liability is allocated in a final way. The li-
censee or operator who is held liable still has the possibility of a right of 
recourse against a third party who may be liable. In addition, it might be 
possible to pass on liability, e.g. on the basis of contract. This may be the 
case if, for example, defective materials were delivered to the licensee of a 
nuclear power plant. If such a shifting of the liability burden could take 
place, one could argue that the liability is simply transferred. Moreover, 
economists could argue that such a reallocation complies with the princi-
ples of the Coase theorem.146 Indeed, an efficient allocation of resources 
nevertheless took place to the extent in which the ones who actually con-
tributed to the loss are still held liable.
144. See WANG, supra note 99, at 82.
145. See LIU, supra note 102, at 212.
146. See Michael Trebilcock & Ralph Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident Law, 17 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 215, 232–35 (1997).
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However, this private reallocation of liability may not always be pos-
sible and, as discussed supra, the scope for recourse according to the con-
ventions is in some cases quite limited. From that perspective, channeling 
of liability can hardly be considered as an efficient mechanism for the pre-
vention of accidents or as an optimal tool for victim compensation.
The March 2011 Fukushima incident in Japan illustrates some of the 
undesirable consequences of channeling. The first reports on the Fukushi-
ma case made clear that the meltdown of the nuclear reactors may have 
been caused by the simple fact that the generators for the cooling system 
were located in the basement of the turbine buildings, which of course 
made them vulnerable to a tsunami.147 Was this the result of negligent ac-
tion by the operator, TEPCO, or rather the result of bad design or engineer-
ing by General Electric? In the former case, a channeling of the liability to 
TEPCO would be problematic since channeling would lead to an exclusion 
of liability of all other parties who may have contributed to the risk—in this 
particular case (at least potentially), General Electric. The Fukushima case 
suggests that channeling can be problematic in removing incentives for 
prevention from other parties who are able to limit or otherwise influence a 
risk.148
E. Insurability
Finally, we turn to the consequences of channeling from an insurabil-
ity perspective. As discussed supra, a major disadvantage of joint and sev-
eral liability is that one injurer (and therefore his liability insurer) may be 
held to compensate not only for the loss caused by that injurer, but also for 
the loss caused by others. Therefore, channeling, which is, in fact, the re-
verse of joint and several liability, should be an ideal system from an insur-
ability perspective. Channeling has the advantage of making clear that a 
suit can only be brought against one actor, which would make the life of 
liability insurers much easier. Indeed, some have argued that channeling is 
147. See Reiji Yoshida, GE Plan Followed with Inflexibility, JAPAN TIMES (July 14, 2011),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/14/news/ge-plan-followed-with-
inflexibility/#.VowMH5MrLVo. 
148. See Michael Faure & Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear 
Incident at Fukushima: Who Compensates the Victims?, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
129, 213–14 (2012). Japan did not follow the international conventions but introduced its own Nuclear 
Liability Act. This Act is, however, largely shaped on the basis of the same principles as the interna-
tional conventions and hence equally contains a channeling of liability to the licensee of the power 
plant.
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useful since it can improve the insurability of risks.149 Specifically, in the 
nuclear context, only the licensee of a nuclear power plant would have to 
take out insurance coverage.150 Additionally, some defend channeling in oil 
pollution cases on the ground that it would reduce insurance costs.151 Only 
the tanker owner (and no other parties) would have to take out insurance 
coverage.152 However, this insurance argument is rather simplistic and to 
some extent even incorrect.153
Assume that parties other than the licensee of the nuclear plant or the 
tanker owner would be held liable; they could in that case obviously pur-
chase liability insurance as well and, if liability rules were applied correct-
ly, their exposure to liability would be limited to the extent to which they 
contributed to the loss. In other words: if each and every party is held sepa-
rately (proportionally) liable for its own contribution to the risk, liability 
insurance is possible and an inefficient regime such as channeling does not 
have to be used to increase insurability. Indeed, the mere fact that without 
channeling several potentially liable parties will take out insurance cover-
age does not mean that total insurance costs will rise.154
Exclusive channeling may even have disadvantages for the liability in-
surer of the channeled operator. Indeed, the insurer may also have to cover 
accidents in cases where the loss was not caused by his insured, but where 
the damage is only allocated to the operator because of the channeling re-
gime. Since channeling does not provide adequate incentives to other par-
ties who contributed to the loss, channeling can even increase the liability 
exposure for the liability insurer. Channeling thus creates a greater risk 
exposure for the operator and therefore a higher uncertainty for the insurer. 
Therefore, if channeling has any effect on the insurability, it is more likely 
to decrease insurability rather than make liability better insurable.
149. With respect to the channeling for oil pollution liability, see, inter alia, A.H.E. Popp, Liability 
and Compensation for Pollution Damage Caused by Ships Revisited: Report on an International Con-
ference, LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L. Q. 118, 120 (1985).
150. See Herman Cousy, Een nieuwe vorm van schuldloze aansprakelijkheid voor schade 
veroorzaakt door het vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie, JURA FALCONIS 35, 46 (1974–1975).
151. See Popp, supra note 149, at 120.
152. See id. 
153. See Vanden Borre, supra note 143, at 366–67; VANDEN BORRE, supra note 120, at 695–97; 
Tom Vanden Borre, Kanalisatie in het debat betreffende de verzekerbaarheid van een risico,
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID, VERZEKERING EN SCHADE 180–82 (2001).
154. See VANDEN BORRE, supra note 120, at 696.
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VI. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Finally, this article will briefly discuss a third situation where liability 
is stretched beyond the original tortfeasor and where someone is held liable 
for acts committed by another person. “Vicarious liability” has been dis-
cussed at great length in the law and economics literature.155 Therefore, this 
article will discuss this phenomenon rather briefly.
A. Respondeat Superior
As discussed supra, when addressing joint and several liability under 
domestic tort law, there are many situations in which persons are held lia-
ble for damage caused by an auxiliary. This is referred to as the common 
law principle of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.156 Liability is 
not strict, but, for example, employers are held liable for damage caused by 
the negligence of their employees157; schools are held liable for torts com-
mitted by students under their care158; and parents are held liable for torts 
committed by their children.159
In some cases, there may be strict vicarious liability. The employer 
would be liable for all harms caused by an employee, without the plaintiff 
being required to show fault on behalf of the principal.160 Fault is often 
presumed.161 In other cases, vicarious liability would be based on negli-
gence. The principal (an employer) would only be liable in a case of negli-
gent supervision of an employee.162 Strict liability obviously makes the 
burden of proof on the victim lighter.163 Many legal systems have such 
155. For a summary of the literature see, inter alia, Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corpo-
rate Civil Liability, in 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 134–49.
156. For a detailed account of the treatment of vicarious liability see the contributions in 
UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHERS (Jaap Spier ed., 2003).
157. For a comparative overview see Susanne Galand-Carval, Comparative Report on Liability for 
Damage Caused by Others. General Questions, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHERS, supra note 156, at 300–04.
158. See generally VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 522–35.
159. Galand-Carval, supra note 157, at 294–98.
160. Id.  at 300.
161. This is, for example, the case in Belgium where all of the civil code employers are held 
strictly liable for damage caused by their employees. See Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, 
Negligence, Strict Liability and Regulation of Safety under Belgian Law: An Introductory Economic 
Analysis, 12 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 95, 102–03 (1987).
162. See Reinier Kraakman, Economic Policy and the Vicarious Liability of Firms, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 238 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) for the difference from an 
economic perspective.
163. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 382.
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rules of liability for torts committed by the subordinate, although the condi-
tions for such liability can differ.164
B. Economic Rationale
From an economic perspective, designating the liable party in this 
contractual setting (between an employer and an employee) is unimportant, 
as long as the liability is freely transferable and both parties are fully in-
formed. This would imply that when, for example, an employer would be 
held liable for a tort committed by his employee, the employer could sanc-
tion the liable employee, e.g. via lower wages, pay reimbursement, or deni-
al of future promotions. If it were the employee who first paid the 
compensation, he could claim reimbursement from the employer. In this 
line of reasoning, it would be unimportant where the liability is imposed 
(on the employer or the employee) since in this contractual relationship, the 
parties could freely allocate the liability according to their preferences. This 
is obviously an application of the well-known Coase theorem.165
In practice, however, such an allocation of liability between principals 
and agents is not always possible, inter alia, because of the limited wealth 
(and hence potential insolvency) of the agent.166 Indeed, the starting point 
for the economic analysis of vicarious liability is that auxiliaries, like em-
ployees, can exercise dangerous activities that can create serious risks for 
third parties—so-called externalities.167 Often the damage that agents could 
cause as a result of the activity may largely outweigh its personal wealth.168
As a result, these employees will be considered judgment proof, which will 
lead to underdeterrence.169 The lawmaker may consider that the employer 
has more wealth than his auxiliary. Hence, the employer may have more 
incentive to take proper care; vicarious liability can provide these incen-
tives. Given the larger wealth of the employer, he has more incentive and 
risks less suffering from underdeterrence as a result of insolvency. Moreo-
ver, the employer has the possibility of controlling the auxiliary via moni-
toring and could, therefore, also increase the level of care exercised by the 
164. For a detailed analysis of the liability for damage caused by others in various legal systems 
see the contributions in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHERS,
supra note 156.
165. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960).
166. See Kraakman, supra note 155, at 135.
167. See Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 914–16 (1980) for the economic foundation for the 
rule of respondeat superior.
168. See Kraakman, supra note 162, at 241–48.
169. Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 914.
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employee. For example, an employer can provide safer material to the em-
ployee or take disciplinary measures for the negligent employee.
The simple economic basis for vicarious liability is the belief that 
shifting liability to the party with more wealth will provide better incen-
tives for prevention.170 The employer/principal could hence act as a gate-
keeper. Holding the gatekeeper vicariously liable for the torts committed by 
the agent provides incentives for efficient monitoring of agents by the prin-
cipals. This same reasoning is also the rationale for corporate criminal lia-
bility.171
C. Critics
Notwithstanding the potential advantages of vicarious liability, recent 
scholarship has pointed at potential problems with vicarious liability.172
One problem, as mentioned by Steven Shavell,173 is that vicarious liability 
assumes that principals have more capital than agents.174 This is not neces-
sarily so. Undercapitalization of principals—more particularly, corporate 
entities—is possible as well. Hence, there is a strong argument for impos-
ing individual liability in combination with liability of the principal.175
Another criticism on the use of vicarious liability has been formulated 
by Jennifer Arlen. She argues that the traditional argument in favor of vi-
carious liability is seen as an indirect means of sanctioning wrongful em-
ployees, assuming that corporations subject to criminal liability will, in 
turn, sanction the wrongful agent.176 This regime can, according to Arlen, 
lead to potentially perverse incentives for the following reason: if a corpo-
ration is able to monitor its employees optimally, it will have to increase its 
170. See Kraakman, supra note 155, at 134–49.
171. See, inter alia, Mark A. Cohen, Criminal Law as an Instrument of Environmental Policy: 
Theory and Empirics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 208–09 (Anthony Heyes ed., 
2001); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
833, 833–58 (2000).
172. For a detailed analysis of all factors mitigating against strict vicarious liability see Kraakman, 
supra note 155, at 137–40.
173. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 174.
174. See SHARON ODED, INDUCING CORPORATE PROACTIVE COMPLIANCE: LIABILITY CONTROLS
& CORPORATE MONITORS 172–79 (2012) for further information on the economic functions of vicari-
ous liability within corporations. 
175. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and 
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1345–92 (1982); A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corpo-
rate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239–57 (1993).
176. See Jennifer Arlen, Economic Analysis of Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evi-
dence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (Keith Hylton & Alon 
Harel eds., 2012).
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level of corporate enforcement expenditures.177 This might reduce the 
number of agents who commit crime by increasing the probability of detec-
tion and thus reducing the costs of crime. On the other hand, the increased 
enforcement expenditures may also increase the probability that the gov-
ernment will detect those crimes, whereby corporations’ expected criminal 
liability for those crimes is increased.178 This means that additional en-
forcement by firms only increases the firms’ expected criminal liability. 
Thus, vicarious liability could lead to the perverse incentive that a corpora-
tion will reduce the monitoring of its employees in order to avoid the detec-
tion of corporate (environmental) crime.179 Although the criticism of Arlen 
is directed at corporate criminal liability, the “potentially perverse” effects 
that she refers to could equally apply to vicarious liability for torts.180 This 
has been an argument raised against strict vicarious liability,181 and in favor 
of negligence based or so-called composite vicarious liability regimes.182
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, the attribution of liability was reviewed and a few atyp-
ical cases were discussed from a legal, as well as from an economic, per-
spective. Difficult attribution questions often arise when we move outside 
of the simple case where one injurer causes harm to one identifiable victim. 
There are complications from the moment more than one tortfeasor is in-
volved. The starting point from an economic perspective is that tortfeasors 
should still be provided with incentives for taking efficient care and main-
taining efficient activity levels.
This article also demonstrated that a model of solidary liability (often 
referred to as joint and several liability) might meet this goal on the condi-
tion that a negligence standard is applied. This amounts to a model where 
one tortfeasor—the one who is addressed by the victim—will pre-finance 
compensation and will subsequently (via recourse) ask contribution from 
the other tortfeasors involved. To the extent that the other tortfeasors are 
identified and solvent they will contribute to the extent that they effectively 
caused the harm, in which case they are efficiently deterred.
177. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 687–779 (1997).
178. Id.
179. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 833, 833–67 (1994).
180. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 177, at 687–779.
181. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 382. They hold: “Strict liability gives the employer an 
incentive to remain silent in the hope of escaping detection.”.
182. See ODED, supra note 174, at 186–87; Kraakman, supra note 155, at 142–44.
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More problems also arise when either a strict liability standard is ap-
plied or when one or more of the contributing tortfeasors is insolvent. In 
these cases, allocating liability just to the tortfeasor who was sued by the 
victim may lead to overdeterrence and potentially to crushing liability. This 
could de facto lead to a reduced activity level of that one particular tortfea-
sor since he is exposed to harm not caused by his activity. In these cases, a 
proportional solution, i.e. exposing the tortfeasor only to the extent to 
which he has contributed to the harm, may be more desirable. Obviously, 
this may lead to more difficulties for victims in bringing the suit (since they 
potentially will have to sue all tortfeasors and obtain a partial recovery 
from each of them). Hence, there is no easy answer since joint and several 
liability may have advantages, but it may have disadvantages as well, such 
as endangering the insurability of the risk.
The same is also the case for the phenomenon of vicarious liability to 
some extent. Again, there are strong arguments in favor of vicarious liabil-
ity of principals for the acts of their agents, but this is largely based on the 
assumption that principals have better capitalization than their agents, 
which may not always be the case. Moreover, strict vicarious liability could 
even lead to the perverse effect of reducing the internal monitoring by the 
principal—more particularly a corporate actor.
Problems also arise when the legislature intervenes and solely allo-
cates liability to one of the many possible actors, so-called channeling of 
liability. The arguments against this instrument seem to be overwhelming. 
One could defend channeling as a mechanism where liability is allocated to 
the cheapest cost avoider, but that does not always explain why others who 
equally contribute to the risk should be totally excluded from liability. Ad-
ditionally, the insurability argument cannot satisfactorily justify channel-
ing. The history—specifically of the nuclear liability conventions—shows 
that channeling of liability is the result of interest group politics rather than 
of the design of an efficient accident law.
It is interesting to note that in the law, more particularly in the recently 
adopted Principles of European Tort Law (PETL), a clear choice is made in
favor of proportional liability (particularly in cases where there is causal 
uncertainty). However, when causation is clear and more than one tortfea-
sor contributed to causing the harm, the Principles opt for solidary liability. 
That is an interesting distinction which certainly merits further research.
There are also other cases where tort law moves liability beyond the 
original tortfeasor. One can think of extending liability, for example, to 
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lenders (like financial institutions)183 or manufacturers (extended producer 
responsibility).184 The possible economic justifications in favor of those 
extensions remain beyond the scope of this article, but are certainly worth 
noting. A trade-off often has to be made in many of these cases, like the 
ones discussed supra, where tort law moves beyond the original tortfeasor. 
There is a conflict between the advantages of those extended liability re-
gimes (by, for example, providing additional incentives for monitoring, 
gatekeeping and control), versus increased administrative costs and the 
danger of overdeterrence, potentially leading to a chilling effect.185 It is 
precisely because the solutions to those trade-offs often go beyond eco-
nomics and are also based on (distributional) policy choices that these an-
swers may largely differ between legal systems. However, economic 
analysis can undoubtedly enrich the policy debate and lead to better-
reasoned policy decisions.
183. See James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, The Search for Deep Pockets: Is “Extended Liabil-
ity” Expensive Liability?, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 232, 232–58 (1997).
184. See Karl Lidgren & Göran Skogh, Extended Producer Responsibility: Recycling, Liability, 
and Guarantee Funds, 21 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 170, 170–81 (1996) for a discussion on 
extended producer responsibility. 
185. See Jef De Mot & Michael Faure, Public Authority Liability and the Chilling Effect, 22 TORT
L. REV. 120, 120–33 (2014) for a discussion on chilling effects in public authority liability. 
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